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In an influential essay, Gerald Grumet charac-terized “rationing through inconvenience” as a potent but secretive strategy for “slowing and 
controlling the use of services and payment for ser-
vices by impeding, inconveniencing, and confus-
ing providers and consumers alike.”1 Donald Light 
similarly decried “practices [that] include rejecting 
claims in whole or in part for procedural or techni-
cal reasons, making the claims process and its rules 
extremely complex, and [ultimately] inducing claim-
ants to give up.”2 For clinicians, the phrase “ration-
ing through inconvenience” usually evokes wasted 
time, unnecessary red tape, byzantine bureaucratic 
systems, escalating administrative expenditures, and 
even “ambiguity, deception, or harassment.”3 For 
patients, inconveniences like paperwork and travel 
can stand as a barrier to using insurance or accessing 
needed health care. Recent efforts, for example, by 
the American College of Physicians, have sought to 
mitigate or eliminate administrative tasks and their 
adverse effects.4
However, inconvenience of service use is also a 
commonplace rationing mechanism for encourag-
ing socially preferred choices. Consider the following 
examples:
• Pascaline Dupas and colleagues found that, 
in western Kenya, combining free provision of a 
chlorine water treatment (a diarrhea prophylactic) 
with a voucher system that imposes the inconve-
nience of having to redeem a coupon at a local 
store screened out 88 percent of those who would 
otherwise accept the product without using it.5 
Similarly, Xiaochen Ma and coauthors found that 
giving Chinese children a voucher redeemable for 
eyeglasses in a store “modestly improved targeting 
efficiency” compared to handing out eyeglasses.6
Using burdensome arrangements—application processes, forms, waiting periods, and the like—as 
a strategy for limiting the use of health care resources has been roundly but uncritically condemned. Under 
some conditions, it may be legitimate. It may even be preferable to direct rationing.
Can Rationing through 
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• Rationing through inconve-
nience can also influence the par-
ticular health service consumed. 
Making a preferred treatment the 
default, overridden only with ef-
fort, has been proposed as a way of 
curbing health expenditure.7 For 
example, a physician might be re-
quired to navigate to the bottom of 
a computerized list to find the op-
tion that would allow her to refuse 
generic substitution.8 To the ex-
tent that a small inconvenience is 
used to shape preferred consump-
tion, such nudges (recently called 
“effort taxes”9) arguably constitute 
rationing through inconvenience.
• An inconvenience, and its ab-
sence, can also affect patients’ 
choice of provider. Americans rely 
on expensive specialists much more 
than patients in other countries 
do, in part because waits are lon-
ger in other countries.10 About one 
in five urgent care center users said 
they chose their provider because 
the location was “more conve-
nient, compared to other facilities 
like hospitals, doctors’ offices and 
community health centers.”11 
Locating primary care clinics in 
convenient sites might likewise 
lure patients with nonemergency 
conditions away from expensive 
and less convenient emergency 
departments.12 Ironically, however, 
a study of pharmacy-based retail 
clinics “found that 58 percent of 
retail clinic visits for low-acuity 
conditions represented new utili-
zation and that retail clinic use was 
associated with a modest increase 
in spending, of $14 per person 
per year.”13 Accordingly, com-
mentators wonder whether other 
convenient, lower-priced options 
such as “telehealth” or kiosks of-
fering testing in stores “could also 
end up leading to overall increases 
in health spending, despite being 
touted as cost-savers.”14
• Every U.S. state has a vaccina-
tion mandate but also has proce-
dures for exempting individuals on 
medical, religious, or philosophical 
grounds. Several authors have pro-
posed “making [nonmedical] ex-
emptions for immunizations more 
difficult to obtain.”15 Their idea 
is to make the legal procedure for 
obtaining exemptions more “ar-
duous” by, for instance, requiring 
“a notarized parental statement, 
counseling, and health depart-
ment approval,” as some states do. 
They point out that arduous ex-
emption procedures are inversely 
related to the rate of nonmedical 
exemptions.16 Parents who are 
deeply and genuinely opposed to 
vaccinations may select to undergo 
the inconvenience, while children 
of the remainder get vaccinated.
In this article, we provide a com-
prehensive analysis and a norma-
tive assessment of rationing through 
inconvenience as a form of ration-
ing. We argue that under certain 
conditions, rationing through in-
convenience may turn out to serve 
as a legitimate and even a preferable 
tool for rationing; we propose a re-
search agenda to identify more pre-
cisely when that might be the case 
and when, alternatively, rationing 
through inconvenience remains ethi-
cally undesirable. After defining and 
illustrating rationing through incon-
venience, we turn to its moral advan-
tages and disadvantages over other 
rationing methods.
Rationing through 
Inconvenience: A Working 
Definition
By “rationing through inconve-nience”  in the health sphere, we 
refer to a nonfinancial burden (the in-
convenience) that is either intended 
to cause or has the effect of causing 
patients or clinicians to choose an 
option for health-related consump-
tion that is preferred by the health 
system for its fairness, efficiency, or 
other distributive desiderata beyond 
assisting the immediate patient. This 
definition can be unbundled.
First, rationing through incon-
venience is a form of rationing. We 
take it as a starting assumption that 
rationing, understood as scarce-
resource prioritization, is inevitable 
and, in a society that has goals be-
yond optimizing health care for in-
dividual patients—such as improving 
societal health care, education, or 
overall welfare—prudent and fair.17 
Whether in public or private insur-
ance pools, health care resources are 
collective. The resulting collective ac-
tion problems require some system of 
allocation, whether direct (such as a 
committee decision) or indirect (such 
as a pricing mechanism or ration-
ing through inconvenience). Indeed, 
the definition holds that rationing 
through inconvenience comprises 
only those inconveniences that lead, 
or are intended to lead, to otherwise 
appropriate distributions. Distribu-
tions can be appropriate for their 
fairness, efficiency, contribution to 
social equality, or other societal re-
sponsibilities in medical or economic 
terms. By contrast, when inconve-
niences lead, or are intended to lead, 
only to private profit for an insurer 
whose subscribers are dissuaded from 
claiming their moral and legal rights, 
for example, and the inconveniences 
advance no social good, then they do 
not count as rationing through in-
convenience. The reason for thus lim-
iting the scope of our investigation is 
that when inconveniences serve no 
For clinicians, the phrase “rationing through 
inconvenience” usually evokes wasted time and 
unnecessary red tape. However, inconvenience of service 
use is also a commonplace rationing mechanism for 
encouraging socially preferred choices.
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good purpose, ethical investigation 
is unnecessary: such inconveniences 
only add offense to injury and are ob-
viously undesirable.
Second, other policy uses of in-
convenience lie outside our ambit. 
For example, many “nudges”18 use 
inconvenience to help individuals 
make choices that are good for them; 
for example, making it comparatively 
harder to purchase junk food can 
nudge consumers toward healthier 
foods.19 Without a goal or an effect 
of allocating scarce resources better, 
these other uses of inconvenience 
do not count as rationing through 
inconvenience.
Third, our definition presumes 
inconvenience, by which we mean a 
burden that is not directly financial. 
An example of a nonfinancial burden 
is losing time (such as by standing in 
line or filling out a long form). Anoth-
er is putting in effort (by redeeming a 
coupon to obtain health products or 
seeing a doctor for a prescription for 
antibiotics rather than buying them 
over the counter). A third example is 
getting hospitalized as a condition of 
reimbursement for medical expens-
es.20 Others are traveling to distant 
locations (to see a within-network 
specialist) and performing unpleasant 
tasks (waking up very early to be first 
in line or calling automated interac-
tive customer service lines). Still an-
other is being assertive (to convince 
an administrator that one’s medical 
need is urgent enough to require 
immediate callback from the physi-
cian). In the health care context, the 
burden can fall on the patient or her 
advocates, including the clinician or 
other staff members. In some cases, 
this burden will be associated with 
a financial cost—possibly direct cost 
(paying for gas for transportation), 
indirect cost (paying for childcare 
while the parent is standing in line), 
or an opportunity cost (lost wages).21 
However, that financial cost is not 
what makes the burden constitute ra-
tioning through inconvenience.
Fourth, rationing through incon-
venience is indirect in that it oper-
ates through patient or clinician 
choice: the reduction in consump-
tion is mediated by the impact on 
whether patients and clinicians 
choose a treatment and which treat-
ment choices they make. This choice-
based characteristic is shared by the 
central form of indirect rationing: 
financial cost sharing, such as with 
copays, deductibles, and capitated 
physician reimbursement.22 In that 
respect, rationing through incon-
venience is unlike overt, or direct, 
rationing mechanisms such as alloca-
tion criteria and formularies.23 Still, 
as illustrated below, direct ration-
ing mechanisms may also function 
as rationing through inconvenience. 
So can waiting lists. For example, or-
gan waiting lists constitute rationing 
through inconvenience inasmuch as 
they dissuade consumption by pa-
tients who choose not to wait and 
instead forgo transplantation, seek al-
ternative treatments, or step up their 
efforts to stay healthy.
Fifth, as we define it, rationing 
through inconvenience mobilizes 
only relatively small to moderate in-
conveniences. It leaves individuals 
with a genuine choice to forgo a ben-
efit. When the alternatives are severe 
pain, true humiliations, or signifi-
cant health risks, the patient could 
plausibly be said to lack real choice, 
making the rationing direct per our 
definition. Suffering mild knee pain 
while on a waiting list for a wholly 
elective knee surgery, for which wait-
ing is safe but prolongs discomfort, 
can be a form of rationing through 
inconvenience, whose ethics can be 
debated. Suffering tremendously on 
the surgery waiting list as a disincen-
tive against seeking the surgery is too 
burdensome to count as rationing 
through inconvenience. Drawing the 
line between moderate and severe in-
convenience can be difficult, but the 
core idea is that the inconvenience 
cannot be “unduly burdensome,” to 
borrow a phrase from constitutional 
jurisprudence around abortion law.24
Finally, by our definition, ration-
ing through inconvenience need not 
be intended by payors or planners. It 
need not even be noticed by them. 
For example, a form may be complex 
and inconvenient to fill, not inten-
tionally but simply because exclusion 
criteria are genuinely complex or be-
cause the form writer is incompetent.
An Illustration
To illustrate how rationing through inconvenience interacts 
with, and sometimes dwarfs, direct 
rationing, we summarize data, previ-
ously reported in the literature, from 
a pharmacy benefits manager.25 The 
data covers preauthorization deci-
sions concerning whether to allow 
patients access to an expensive drug 
for off-label usage, recorded over a 
one-year period. These data provide a 
one-year snapshot of actions taken in 
various cases. For simplicity of illus-
tration, we treat the case flow as if it 
represented a complete set. Although 
our discussion is based on real data, 
we offer this as a conceptual illustra-
tion, not claiming generalizability to 
any other context. We assume that 
the manager’s procedures were a bona 
fide attempt to allocate scarce health 
care resources more appropriately, not 
merely an attempt to avoid coverage 
obligations. The figure summarizes 
the data, with each symbol represent-
ing approximately 386 patients (and 
the physician treating each).
During this period, the man-
ager received 38,621 requests to pay 
for use of expensive drugs off-label, 
which presumably were driven by 
physicians’ recommending such care 
for their patients. Another unknown 
number of patients (on the left in 
the figure) who could have benefit-
ted from the off-label use of a drug 
were deterred from even applying, 
presumably because the time and 
effort involved were predicted to be 
too burdensome for these patients or 
for their physicians. This is already 
a form of rationing through incon-
venience. Further research should 
document these effects.
The data show that, upon receiv-
ing these 38,621 requests for off-label 
use of expensive drugs, the manager 
accepted 90 percent (34,819, group 
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I in in the figure) and denied only 
10 percent (3,802, group II in the 
figure).26 Notably, even the vast ma-
jority of applicants who wound up 
successful suffered the inconvenience 
of making the application. For that 
reason and because appeal remained 
possible, this preauthorization pro-
cess was not a pure example of direct 
rationing. It was arguably rationing 
through inconvenience.
There are more complete data at 
the next phase, concerning the 3,802 
patients who were initially denied 
coverage of their drug (group II in the 
figure). Among them, 2,172 patients 
(6 percent of the original applicants, 
group II.A) simply went away, while 
1,630 (4 percent of the original ap-
plicants, group II.B) submitted the 
necessary documents to appeal the 
initial denial decision. We cannot 
observe the counterfactual for the 
former 2,172 patients. How many 
would have been successful had they 
appealed? Nonetheless, these patients 
illustrate a second phase of ration-
ing through inconvenience. In other 
words, most of the patients whose 
physicians initially believed that they 
could benefit from an off-label use of 
a drug but were denied chose to self-
ration, declining to further pursue 
this perceived medical need.
Of the 1,630 patients who went 
through additional hassle and sub-
mitted appeals, 1,404 (3.6 percent of 
the original applicants and 86 percent 
of appellants, group II.B.1) won their 
appeals. The 226 appellants who were 
ultimately rejected (0.6 percent of the 
original applicants and 14 percent of 
appellants, group II.B.2) are the only 
pure cases of direct rationing.
Overall, then, the pharmacy bene-
fits manager’s process directly rationed 
only 226 cases. That’s a mere 0.6 per-
cent of the applicants, all 38,621 of 
whom were inconvenienced by the 
application procedures, and some of 
whom were also inconvenienced by 
appealing. The process used ration-
ing through inconvenience to deter 
2,172 appeals and an unknown (but 
probably much larger) number of 
patients from applying in the first 
place. When understanding the man-
ager’s procedure as a whole, we can 
conservatively say that, by deterring 
2,172 cases of consumption, covert 
rationing through inconvenience was 
numerically ten times more signifi-
cant than the overt direct rationing 
mechanism, which proscribed only 
226 cases.
Current distributive ethics theo-
ry focuses primarily on the desired 
distributive pattern (namely, who 
should have how much and on what 
basis) and on the desired distributive 
currency (what should be distribut-
ed).27 We propose a research agenda 
on the morally right method of ration-
ing.28 As we show, rationing through 
inconvenience has important advan-
tages over direct rationing as well 
as over indirect rationing through a 
financial cost. It also has important 
disadvantages.
We now review several consider-
ations that can affect the merits and 
demerits of rationing through incon-
venience as compared to other ration-
ing mechanisms, especially in health 
care. These considerations are clus-
tered around
• increasing autonomy,
• reducing regressivity and influ-
encing disparities,
• creating waste and conflicts of 
interest,
• increasing psychological impact 
on consumption decisions,
• reducing commodification and 
related considerations, and
• increasing public acceptability 
while reducing transparency.
Increasing Autonomy
Stephan Burton and colleagues de-fend indirect rationing of drugs 
on grounds of autonomy: “Ethically 
acceptable policies should respect the 
autonomy of both patients and phy-
sicians. Some might place a higher 
value on convenience or fewer side 
effects, while others might opt for 
greater economy. . . . [P]hysicians 
should be free to exercise their judg-
ment about the best drugs to enhance 
each patient’s well-being.”29 They 
hold this to be an important ethical 
advantage of indirect rationing meth-
ods like physician capitation, tiered 
copayments, and drug benefit caps 
over direct rationing methods. Since 
rationing through inconvenience is a 
form of indirect rationing, one could 
argue that it has the same important 
advantage of respect for autonomy.
However, rationing social resourc-
es, by definition, implicates the rights 
of other claimants on the resources, 
claimants such as other members of 
an insurance pool, who have an in-
terest in keeping premiums low. As 
a result, no general strong obligation 
exists to “respect the autonomy of 
both patients and physicians.” With 
rationing, decisions on allocation be-
tween candidate recipients do not fall 
to the individual candidate to decide 
on her own.30 For example, a patient 
on a transplant list lacks any auton-
omy right to kick other patients off 
it, even if not getting the transplant 
would profoundly set back her au-
tonomously chosen plan of life. 
That said, we can count it as a lim-
ited advantage of rationing through 
inconvenience that it can preserve 
patient choice. Other things being 
equal, it is preferable to facilitate 
Decisions on allocation between candidate recipients do 
not fall to the individual candidate to decide 
on her own. That said, we can count it as a limited 
advantage of rationing through inconvenience that it can 
preserve patient choice.
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patient choice about, for example, 
whether to undergo inconvenience 
and receive the benefi t—even regard-
ing social-resource priorities over 
which patients lack strong autonomy 
rights.
One instrumental advantage of 
choice-based mechanisms is that they 
personalize the use of resources. Pa-
tients vary in their biology, circum-
stances, and values, with different 
medical and welfare needs. Personal-
ization is the attempt to heed those 
different needs in the allocation of 
scarce resources. In contrast, without 
choice, health policy must proceed 
on “general presumptions,” which, as 
John Stuart Mill wrote, “may be alto-
gether wrong, and even if right, are as 
likely as not to be misapplied to indi-
vidual cases.”31 Society lacks pertinent 
information about individual vari-
ability in many areas where the “or-
dinary man or woman has means of 
knowledge immeasurably surpassing 
those that can be possessed by anyone 
else.”32 By separating individuals who 
are willing to accept inconvenience to 
procure a good or service from ones 
who are not, rationing through in-
convenience gathers that information 
and applies it to personalize rationing 
policy. For example, in Dupas and 
colleagues’ experiment, families who 
know that they are unlikely to use 
the chlorine tablets are less likely to 
submit to the inconvenience of pro-
curing them.33 In this way an incon-
venience—an “ordeal”34—may lead 
to more effi cient allocation.
In direct rationing, collecting 
information from patients and per-
sonalizing care is more challenging. 
Consider the case of British cancer 
patient David Cook, who sought 
coverage for an expensive cancer drug 
from the British National Health Sys-
tem, although the National Institute 
for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) had at the time deemed that 
drug too expensive for the benefi ts it 
generates. NICE’s cost-effectiveness 
recommendations depend on broad 
generalizations that are based on data 
about the average patient with the rel-
evant disease. But for some patients, 
the likely benefi ts from the relevant 
drug are far greater than they are for 
the average patient. Cook persuaded 
a committee that, in his case, the rele-
vant cancer drug would be cost effec-
tive, and this decision saved his life.35 
Nevertheless, such direct rationing by 
committee is potentially expensive, 
slow, and haphazard in a world where 
millions of health care decisions are 
made every day.36 It also depends on 
information that is in the hands of 
the patients and their physicians and 
is subject to familiar self-reporting bi-
ases, with perverse incentives to offer 
misguiding information to gain ac-
cess to the drug.
The sharing of otherwise private 
information can also be demeaning. 
How Rationing through Inconvenience Dwarfs One 
Pharmacy Benefits Manager’s Direct Rationing 
The data we have plotted in this figure come from J. R. Teagarden et al., “Influence of Pharmacy Benefit Practices on Off-Label 
Dispensing of Drugs in the United States,” Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics 91, no. 5 (2012): 943-45.
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Cook described pleading for his life 
in the face of a group of people who 
are free from his condition as humili-
ating.37 The committee’s appropriate 
skepticism may exacerbate the hu-
miliation (“Can you prove to us that 
you feel that much pain by night?”). 
The inevitable inquisitorial method 
recalls Jonathan Wolff ’s critique of 
conditional unemployment benefit 
program inspections that can shame 
and humiliate applicants.38
In contrast, rationing through 
inconvenience allows individual pa-
tients and clinicians to utilize their 
private information about the pa-
tient’s case—including the patient’s 
medical factors, physiological factors, 
personal circumstances, and personal 
values—to swiftly determine whether 
access to a treatment option is worth 
the burden of the inconvenience for 
her. In this way, rationing through 
inconvenience is similar to rationing 
through cost-sharing, where the the-
ory is that patients who perceive the 
greatest benefits of a given treatment 
would rationally have the highest 
willingness to pay for that treatment 
and, in a free market, would bid up 
its price until they secured that treat-
ment over others who value it less. 
This classic economic theory applies 
equally to rationing through incon-
venience. Patients who perceive the 
greatest benefits from a treatment will 
similarly have what we could call the 
greatest “willingness to suffer” the in-
conveniences that may come with it. 
Assuming that central rationers can 
set the level of inconvenience for a 
given treatment to make it commen-
surate with its cost-benefit profile, 
rationing through inconvenience has 
the potential to achieve personaliza-
tion as efficiently as cost sharing (and, 
as discussed below, without some of 
cost sharing’s disadvantages).
The greater patient choice in ra-
tioning through inconvenience may 
matter from a certain luck-egalitar-
ian viewpoint as well. According to 
luck egalitarianism, when a person’s 
disadvantage results from her own 
avoidable choices, then her disad-
vantage is somewhat fairer than if 
she suffered the disadvantage with-
out such choice.39 Luck egalitar-
ians argue, for example, that justice 
does not require compensation for 
a financial loss consequent to a per-
fectly avoidable gamble; it requires 
compensation only for losses that are 
due to genetic incapacity, structural 
unemployment, and the like. In the 
rationing-through-inconvenience 
context, if certain people choose to 
avoid a reasonable inconvenience as-
sociated with some health care, then 
their resulting poorer outcomes may 
nonetheless be fair at the bar of luck 
egalitarianism.
Overall, then, rationing through 
inconvenience has certain autonomy-
related advantages over direct forms 
of rationing. Like cost sharing, it has 
the potential to shape consumption 
decisions in the directions preferred 
by a system rationer while preserving 
patient and physician choices. This 
gives it an advantage (albeit a defea-
sible one) in terms of personalization 
of decisions and a form of luck-egali-
tarian justice.
Reducing Regressivity and 
Influencing Disparities
In the current discussion, “regressiv-ity” will designate the concern that 
a given mode of rationing tends to 
impose worse health care, health, or 
overall outcomes on poorer patients. 
Regressivity is, of course, a major 
concern about financial cost-sharing 
mechanisms of rationing.40 Other 
forms of rationing, such as central-
ized allocation and lotteries, avoid 
regressivity more easily.
The regressivity problem is smaller 
in rationing through inconvenience 
than in cost sharing.41 Some individu-
als have great wealth, while others are 
poor. But all people have twenty-four 
hours in a day, a limited attention 
span, and a body that can be in only 
one place at a time. Accordingly, 
scholars have recognized that “charg-
ing for the product will tend to gener-
ate a wealthier set of customers than 
requiring customers to spend time 
picking it up”42 and that a queue 
“stacks up reasonably well on a fair-
ness criterion, in that anyone can get 
in the queue.”43 In this way, ration-
ing through inconvenience is less re-
gressive than rationing through cost 
sharing.
Indeed, one might argue that 
spending time picking up a product 
or standing in line has a worse impact 
on high earners than on the poor be-
cause, for high earners, time is worth 
more money in opportunity cost.44 
Psychologically, this opportunity cost 
may make the rich loath to wait,45 but 
the objective loss of utility need not 
be greater for the rich. A given dol-
lar loss is also a smaller marginal loss 
of objective utility for those who have 
more dollars.
All that said, rationing through 
inconvenience can remain some-
what regressive. For example, in 
the United States, the majority of 
low-paid workers do not enjoy paid 
medical leave. Spending many hours 
in line for health care would impose 
onerous burdens on them. In some 
cases, wealthier individuals will be 
better able to navigate or minimize 
an inconvenience. For example, if a 
queue forms when the doors happen 
to open, wealthier individuals may be 
able to use private transportation to 
get there first.46 Wealthier individu-
als may also afford to live nearer to 
care centers, purchase a plan with a 
broader provider network,47 or even 
pay for concierge medicine.48 In 
the United States, wealthy patients 
spend less time on organ waiting 
Rationing through inconvenience is less regressive than 
rationing through cost sharing. All people have 
twenty-four hours in a day, a limited attention span, and 
a body that can be in only one place at a time.
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lists partly because they pay doc-
tors who list them earlier or, in rare 
cases, because they can indirectly buy 
their way into multiple organ wait-
ing lists.49 Even in the more socialized 
Swedish public health care system, 
the lowest quartile of disposable in-
come predicts longer waiting times 
for orthopedic (27 percent longer) 
and general surgery (34 percent), as 
compared to the highest quartile.50 
Presumably, when lines become very 
long, the rich opt out of Sweden’s 
public system and pay for surgeries 
out of pocket. Medical tourism en-
ables rich Canadians to circumvent 
national queues and undergo treat-
ment abroad.51 Finally, wealthier in-
dividuals can hire administrators to 
fill burdensome forms for them.
Rationing through inconvenience 
can certainly give rise to disparities 
that are not directly income based. 
Racial and ethnic disparities in wait 
times are well-documented in the 
United States.52 White, educated 
(and wealthy) patients have greater 
sway on triage officers; their doctors 
instruct them exactly what to do to 
meet residential or “seniority” criteria 
for transplant eligibility and how to 
score other scarce resources that are 
being directly rationed.53 In a sur-
vey of Zambian HIV patients who 
were eligible for antiretrovirals, those 
who—dangerously—were not on 
antiretrovirals were 50 percent like-
lier than those on antiretrovirals to 
report that it would be very difficult 
for them to get to the clinic.54 In this 
instance, unintended inconvenience 
seemed to create a barrier to service 
utilization and therefore also a dis-
parity. And the populations affected 
adversely were geographically, not 
economically, demarcated. Ration-
ing through inconvenience can also 
be harder on patients with specific 
conditions. For patients living with 
depression, a long form or wait may 
require too much energy and emo-
tional wherewithal.
Trying to erect barriers for some 
patients may end up dissuading oth-
ers from claiming their rights. Mike 
Mitka has pointed out this kind of 
problem in a 2006 U.S. law that 
“intended to . . . reduce the num-
ber of illegal immigrants fraudu-
lently receiving health care through 
Medicaid [by requiring] Medicaid 
recipients to provide more stringent 
documentation of citizenship, such 
as appearing at government offices 
with original documents like a birth 
certificate or driving license, rather 
than mailing photocopies of such 
items.”55 But the mandate to docu-
ment citizenship also imposed oner-
ous paperwork burdens on those who 
were eligible to receive coverage and 
health care, driving tens of thousands 
of Americans off the program.56 This 
requirement was overridden in 2009, 
yet similar problems persist: as Patri-
cia Illingworth and Wendy Parmet 
have noted, “[T]he complexity of 
the Medicaid application process, 
which can be daunting even for low-
income, English-speaking applicants 
. . . deters many eligible immigrants 
from enrolling.”57
While it is clearly alarming when 
the impact of rationing through in-
convenience is worse for disadvan-
taged populations (as, for example, 
when filling out paperwork is harder 
on patients with lower literacy), ra-
tioning through inconvenience is 
sometimes more challenging for ad-
vantaged populations. For a busy 
CEO, losing time by being forced 
to show up in person can be harder 
than for a much poorer, unemployed 
person without a binding schedule. 
The 2006 U.S. law that required 
citizenship documentation for join-
ing Medicaid turned out to harm 
Latino patients less, and in two states 
to benefit them, since they had to 
keep their identity documentation 
intact anyway.58 When the impact is 
unequal between populations but the 
winners are socially disadvantaged, 
some would not consider the unequal 
impact unfair.
To reduce the bad disparities, 
rationing through inconvenience 
should be employed only carefully. 
Formal, periodic assessments should 
evaluate the impact on different 
populations. When a population is 
found to be adversely affected, ration-
ing through inconvenience can be 
coupled with ameliorative measures. 
For example, forms can be given in 
multiple languages and geared to 
low levels of literacy. Social workers 
or specially trained experts can as-
sist patients from adversely affected 
populations. When feasible, ration-
ing through inconvenience policies 
should be calibrated to the realistic 
abilities of particular profiles of pa-
tients and providers, not as one-size-
fits-all approaches. In some instances, 
a hardship waiver would be feasible 
and appropriate. A poor patient, or a 
provider in an overburdened commu-
nity clinic,59 should not be held to the 
same standard of inconvenience as a 
more privileged person. Yet another 
approach to reducing the adverse 
impact on disadvantaged groups 
would be to maintain a plurality of 
optional inconveniences—stand in a 
long line or fill out a long form, for 
example. Finally, it may even be pos-
sible to compensate groups dispro-
portionately and unfairly affected by 
inconvenience. If all these corrective 
measures turn out to be infeasible in 
a given context, though, and alterna-
tive rationing methods will avoid the 
disparate impact, then avoiding ra-
tioning through inconvenience may 
be better there.
Creating Waste and Conflicts 
of Interest
Rationing through inconvenience is wasteful in a number of ways. 
At the most fundamental level, it 
deliberately wastes time and effort. 
As though that were not enough, 
like cost sharing, its impositions are 
typically most significant for the sick, 
who are relatively disadvantaged due 
to illness. For a health system design-
er to intentionally reduce the welfare 
of its intended beneficiaries and spe-
cifically to make care less accessible 
may seem perverse.
Worse still, from a system per-
spective, rationing through inconve-
nience is typically more wasteful than 
financial cost sharing. When patients 
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pay money, it offsets the insurer’s ex-
penditures, enabling either lower in-
surance premiums and taxes or higher 
insurer profits and hence stronger 
businesses and, ideally, better servic-
es. At the very least, copays and de-
ductibles enrich their recipient, thus 
transferring rather than destroying 
wealth. By contrast, most inconve-
niences have no “recipient.” In that 
respect, they are pure waste. A disad-
vantage of all economic “ordeals” is 
the imposition of deadweight costs to 
qualify for a transfer.”60
But that doesn’t show that ration-
ing through inconvenience is ineffi-
cient overall. Ordeals can remain an 
efficient rationing tool on balance.61 
If, for example, copays to dissuade 
excessive use of magnetic resonance 
imaging are deemed too regressive, 
then the commonly used rationing-
through-inconvenience strategy of 
forcing clinicians to fill out an extra 
form for MRI approval could save 
lots of money compared to no ra-
tioning, and lots of lives compared to 
crude direct rationing of MRI access.
Indeed, the deadweight cost may 
be trivial when a “micro-ordeal”62 or a 
very small “effort tax”63 can dramati-
cally change behavior. For instance, a 
reimbursable coupon rather than the 
product itself can target those likeli-
est to use the product.64 Similarly, 
making a generic drug the easy de-
fault often suffices to prompt patients 
to use it, saving large amounts over 
the branded product. An interesting 
question is what level of inconve-
nience optimizes overall efficiency.65
Besides, not every ordeal involves 
a complete deadweight cost. “Make-
work” is an inconvenience seeking 
partly to reduce applications for un-
employment benefits and to strength-
en the incentives of the unemployed 
to settle into workplaces.66 Yet make-
work can also produce social value, 
even if not optimally. Many bridges 
and dams have been built as make-
work projects.
On a conceptual level, note that a 
sheer credible threat of inconvenience 
may suffice to serve the purpose of so-
liciting private information about the 
strength of a potential beneficiary’s 
desire for a health product or service. 
Thus, what could be called “bluff or-
deals” avoid the deadweight cost al-
together. For instance, the emergency 
room nurse reminds patients who 
call in that, unlike their primary care 
clinic, the emergency room “usually” 
has a long wait. The nurse may read 
the same script even when patient 
load is low and the wait short (on 
which occasions her statement is mis-
leading albeit true), so as to encour-
age a more cost-effective choice. Yet 
although such bluffs are theoretically 
possible, the lack of transparency will 
frequently make them unethical or 
unsustainable.
Rationing through inconvenience 
is wasteful in additional ways. Even 
when an inconvenience is enough 
to optimize the level of disincentive 
for the aggregate patient population, 
it may result in “false negatives,” 
causing many patients not to get ap-
propriate care. That’s because, even 
among those patients who have equal 
need for the care, some have poor 
eyesight, mental or cognitive dis-
abilities, chronic physical pain or less 
wherewithal and perseverance, mak-
ing it harder to complete complicated 
forms, and others live farther from 
the clinic or have inflexible work 
hours, making it harder to queue up 
early in the morning.
That said, wasteful false negatives 
arise in cost sharing as well. Obvious-
ly, some people are short on money, 
and cost sharing has been shown to 
deter even worthwhile care.67 Even 
a small financial cost can limit the 
number of people who obtain a mos-
quito net in an impoverished malaria-
endemic area.68
Special ethical complications arise 
when the inconvenience is borne by 
third parties beyond the patient and 
the payer, including health care pro-
fessionals and their other patients.69 
Prior authorization requests can be a 
considerable burden for physicians, 
for example—“a wasteful adminis-
trative nightmare” that can consume 
“about 20 hours a week per medical 
practice,” according to a physician 
quoted in one story,70—which may 
also leave physicians less time for their 
other patients or prod them to move 
out of networks, work fewer hours, 
or retire early, exacerbating physician 
shortages. Patients, too, may move 
from networks that inconvenience 
them to concierge medicine, with a 
potentially adverse effect on public 
delivery systems.
These burdens can also create con-
flicts of interests. Physicians may pre-
fer to minimize the inconvenience to 
themselves, their family, their office, 
and their other patients. But then, 
their primary interest in their im-
mediate patient’s good care conflicts 
with their secondary interests in, for 
instance, protecting office staff and 
family. These secondary interests may 
all be legitimate yet may also consti-
tute conflicts of interest.71 And just 
like conflicts that stem from managed 
care or relationships with industry, 
they may undermine trust in physi-
cians. When a physician recommends 
against a treatment option that would 
have highly inconvenienced the phy-
sician, the patient cannot know and 
might wonder whether the recom-
mendation reflects medical consid-
erations or the physician’s aversion to 
inconvenience.
As a rationing strategy, cost sharing works only if 
individuals weigh costs against benefits, but in American 
health care, costs are often opaque to the patient 
at the time that she is making health care choices. 
Inconvenience is often more salient.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3358604 
18   HASTINGS CENTER REPORT January-February 2018
Increasing Psychological 
Impact on Consumption 
Decisions
Cost sharing works as a ration-ing strategy only if individuals 
weigh the costs of a procedure against 
its benefits, but in the contemporary 
American web of health care systems, 
costs are often opaque to the patient 
at the time that she is making health 
care choices.72 When a patient checks 
into a hospital, she agrees to pay “all 
reasonable charges,” and the hospi-
tals and physicians rarely inform her 
about each procedure’s cost to her.73 
The bill that smites her with high co-
pays arrives only months afterwards, 
too late for it to dissuade her from se-
lecting cost-ineffective services.
Inconvenience is often more sa-
lient in advance. The very idea of 
inconvenience is that it is psycho-
logically experienced, and filling out 
paperwork, traveling across town, 
or waiting in line often occur before 
one opts to receive treatment, rather 
than after. Information on other in-
conveniences could be made more 
perspicuous. Some U.S. hospitals’ 
emergency rooms already advertise 
their wait times on billboards in or-
der to attract patients to the hospital 
should they later need care. Similarly, 
patients could be notified of the wait 
time to see their own physician, and 
they could be allowed to switch to a 
trainee or nurse practitioner for an 
expedited visit.
This modest typical advantage 
that rationing through inconvenience 
has over cost sharing comes with 
three caveats. First, financial cost is 
sometimes salient even prior to the 
decision whether to accept care. Pa-
tients may be told about copays to see 
a doctor when they enroll in a plan 
or call for an appointment. Second, 
inconveniences and their magnitude 
are not always transparent in advance, 
either to patients or to clinicians. For 
example, a referring clinician might 
be unaware of the parking woes near 
the referral center. Third, any typical 
greater salience of inconvenience as 
compared to cost-sharing is a double-
edged sword because it can lead to 
underuse and because, as discussed 
below, it can also make rational pri-
ority setting less acceptable to the 
public.
Commodification and Related 
Considerations
One longstanding worry about using cost sharing for ration-
ing is commodification: cost shar-
ing seems to some to put a price 
on people’s bodies or health or on 
professional integrity. In a market 
regime, patients, their families, and 
physicians must weigh the patient’s 
health against money in the stark-
est way: Is grandpa’s treatment really 
worth paying that amount of money? 
Is providing the care that, humanly 
and professionally, I feel I should give 
this patient worth my losing the dol-
lars that exceed the capitation level? 
There may be said to be something 
denigrating74 or corrupting75 about 
asking oneself such questions.
When the burden is inconve-
nience, things may seem different. 
Literal commodification objections 
are clearly moot. Health is weighed 
against time and comfort, not against 
dollars. Trade-offs remain, of course, 
but it is not clear whether they are as 
contentious—as allegedly denigrat-
ing or corrupting—as the literal com-
modification of bodies and health for 
money. 
Rationing through inconvenience 
can, however, raise the inverse con-
cern about respect for persons. Mo-
bilizing our aversions to standing in 
line, to listening to annoying muzak 
on the phone, and jumping out of 
bed earlier exploit our bodily vul-
nerability to inconvenience—or our 
psychological and physical need for 
comfort. One might argue that in-
conveniences thereby turn us, or our 
bodies, against ourselves.  Addressing 
more sinister situations, some con-
temporary thinkers have interpreted 
Kant’s ideal of respect for persons 
as making such impositions mor-
ally problematic.76 Intentional bodily 
pressure in investigation or punish-
ment is off limits in civilized societies. 
Moreover, for patients who know 
that they do need that normally cost-
ineffective service or pill, rationing 
through inconvenience forces them 
to perform a very specific task, such 
as standing in a certain line or taking 
a bus to a remote point of service.77 
A bedrock principle of U.S. contract 
law forbids courts from forcing “spe-
cific performance” of promised per-
sonal services.78 Instead, contract law 
cites respect for persons and utilitar-
ian reasons for preferring that courts 
order money damages to compensate 
for breach of the contractual promise. 
On similar grounds, one might argue 
that imposing inconvenience—a spe-
cific task—is worse than imposing 
cost sharing.
Nonetheless, for rationing 
through inconvenience, it is not clear 
what moral weight, if any, to pay 
to these alleged problems. Even if 
respect for persons is in general im-
portant, people are torn all the time 
between wanting one thing for their 
bodies (food, rest) while having to do 
another (commute, work) in order to 
obtain goods they want. Indeed, even 
without rationing through inconve-
nience, the health care system often 
forces patients to perform highly spe-
cific tasks as a precondition of medi-
cal interventions to which they are 
fully entitled—for example, to open 
a pill bottle or to undergo a lengthy 
informed consent process. Concerns 
about lack of respect for persons may 
make sense when the inconvenience 
is severe, degrading, and contrived. 
As the impositions decrease, the 
moral objection arguably dissipates, 
keeping the minor forms of rationing 
through inconvenience that are the 
focus of the present article unobjec-
tionably acceptable in that respect. 
Increasing Public Acceptability 
while Reducing Transparency
Even if otherwise justified, the deliberate imposition of incon-
venience may be outrageous to the 
public. Therefore, it may never come 
to pass, and if it did, it may prove 
politically unstable. Doctors, in par-
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ticular, are already struggling to cut 
administrative chores and may fierce-
ly object to compounding inconve-
niences to them.79
But options for rationing health 
care are never popular. No one loves 
cost sharing either, and no one loves 
being told flatly that something he is 
seeking will be denied him. In fact, in 
the United Kingdom, inconvenient 
queues are widely accepted as a fair 
method of resource allocation. And 
even in the United States, measles 
vaccination exemptions that are in-
convenient to obtain and therefore 
reduce nonmedical exemption rates 
seem to encounter less hostile advo-
cacy than does the explicit narrowing 
of exemption criteria.80
Besides, what the public protests 
depends on what the public knows, 
which depends on transparency. And 
rationing through inconvenience can 
sometimes occur by omission—that 
is, by avoiding interventions that 
would reduce inconvenience as op-
posed to actively introducing incon-
venience—and in that form, it is 
often easy to protect from full scruti-
ny and protest. This may be what one 
health economist meant in explain-
ing why informal inconveniencing 
is “one way to avoid the problem of 
having to choose. And governments 
don’t choose very well. It’s politi-
cally unpopular.”81 For good and for 
ill, rationing through inconvenience 
may escape public scrutiny because it 
rarely requires formal legal interven-
tion or high-level political approval. 
All it takes for a public hospital to use 
rationing through inconvenience is 
to intentionally fail to invest in added 
resources that would have alleviated 
long waits for a certain service. A 
public insurer can easily explain that 
processing times for insurance claims 
are long because administrators wish 
to ensure accuracy even if the full 
truth is that the insurer could expe-
dite them by hiring more administra-
tors or by abolishing the entire review 
process, given the rarity of refusals. 
By contrast, any increase in copays 
must be approved and made public, 
as protection against corruption.
How ethically important is maxi-
mal transparency about the intention 
to ration care and about the intention 
to ration it through inconvenience? 
Maximally transparent rationing 
schemes—ones with explicit, public 
criteria—can help prevent favoritism, 
discrimination, and some other forms 
of bad decision-making. They also 
facilitate accountability, democratic 
control over rationing decisions, and, 
allegedly, public trust in the system.82
Nonetheless, “rationing”—the “R” 
word—remains hopelessly unpopular 
with most Americans,83 its fairness 
and inevitability notwithstanding.84 
This unpopularity may be thought to 
justify some obliqueness in resource 
prioritization. In many areas of pub-
lic life, forgoing maximal transpar-
ency may sometimes be the best 
compromise.85 Whether this is the 
case for rationing health care through 
inconvenience is a complex question, 
affected by philosophical consider-
ations and context alike.
A Research Agenda
Our analysis suggests that variants of rationing through inconve-
nience have both distinct advantages 
and distinct disadvantages over direct 
rationing and over cost-sharing forms 
of indirect rationing. The main ad-
vantages of rationing through incon-
venience are that it maintains choice 
and mobilizes information privy to 
the patient and her physician better 
than direct rationing does and that, 
compared to cost sharing, rationing 
through inconvenience is less regres-
sive and arguably less commodifying. 
However, rationing through incon-
venience has distinct disadvantages, 
especially around disparities, waste, 
and conflicts of interest. Partial so-
lutions may exist for some of these 
disadvantages. Ethical judgments 
about other matters, such as the pub-
lic acceptability of rationing through 
inconvenience and its distinctive psy-
chological impact on consumption 
decisions, depend on contingent po-
litical circumstances and on broader 
normative considerations.
More study should be given to 
rationing through inconvenience, 
particularly in order to understand 
when it works best, how its variants 
compare, and when it should not be 
used. Policy on inconvenience may 
seem harder to study and to system-
atize than policy on financial cost ex-
posure, which has clear units, such as 
dollars; but in fact, the experience of 
paying a copay can vary dramatically 
from person to person, depending, 
for example, on the person’s wealth 
and personal proclivity to loss aver-
sion. And some inconveniences have 
units as well. We can discuss the min-
utes spent filling forms, for example.86 
In short, both approaches merit and 
allow nuanced study and systematic 
policy analysis.
Questions for future scholarly ex-
ploration of rationing through incon-
venience include the following:
• Where is rationing through in-
convenience already in use, and 
when do threats of inconvenience 
actually prompt patients and cli-
nicians to change consumption 
patterns in ways favorable to the 
health system? (Note, however, 
that readily available data may 
exclude patients who, foresee-
ing inconvenience, forgo filing 
paperwork.)
• How much disutility is actu-
ally created by each form of in-
convenience—on average and for 
specific populations and in given 
situations—and can there be units 
of inconvenience, such as minutes 
spent on a form, and of the dis-
value of the inconvenience for the 
person being inconvenienced?
• For any given intervention that 
aims to ration through inconve-
nience, what are its effects on in-
dividual and population health, 
on health-related quality of life, 
on health worker attrition to non-
medical professions, on bad dis-
parities in health care, on public 
trust in physicians, and on other 
important indices?
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Once the impact of rationing 
through inconvenience is more fully 
understood and refined, policy-mak-
ers should compare it to alternative 
rationing mechanisms. In certain 
instances, rationing through incon-
venience will turn out to be ethically 
worse and should be avoided. In oth-
ers, it may turn out to be the best 
mechanism for the inevitable, ratio-
nal, and fair task of rationing health 
care.
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Another Voice Rationing Care through Collaboration  
     and Shared Values
           by james e. sabin
Although “rationing” continues to be a dirty word for the public in health policy discourse, Nir Eyal and colleagues handle the concept exactly right 
in their article in this issue of the Hastings Center Report.1 
They correctly characterize rationing as an ethical require-
ment, not a moral abomination. They identify the key 
health policy question as how rationing can best be done, 
not whether it should be done at all. They make a cogent 
defense of what they call “rationing through inconve-
nience” as a justifiable allocational technique. And they 
wisely call for research on the effectiveness and fairness of 
this approach and other methods of rationing.
I fully agree with their approach to rationing and with 
their argument that the process they provocatively label 
“rationing through inconvenience” should not be rejected 
out of hand. But I believe they have underestimated two 
ways in which the practical impacts of rationing through 
inconvenience limit its potential usefulness: the asymme-
try of its effect on patients and physicians and the way in 
which it reduces the capacity of health systems to learn 
from experience.
James E. Sabin, “Rationing Care through Collaboration and Shared Val-
ues,” Hastings Center Report 48, no. 1 (2018): 22-24. DOI: 10.1002/
hast.807
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3358604 
